*Our translation of Douila al-Julani in Arabic, literally the micro-state of al-Julani
Haytham Manna,
28/4/2025
دويلة الجولاني: أو الإفرازات الرثة
للشمولية الجهادي Original
Translated by Tlaxcala
Haytham Manna (Umm El Mayadhin, Daraa, 1951), physician and anthropologist, is a historic activist for the cause of peoples and human rights. Director of the Scandinavian Institute for Human Rights/Haytham Manna Foundation in Geneva and President of the International Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights (IMHPR), he is the author of some sixty books. Below is chapter 2 of his forthcoming book “Manifesto against Jihadi Fascism”. [chapter 1 chapter 3]
In their essay entitled "The modern nation-state: between Islamism and secularism", Asia Al-Muhtar and Adnan Harawi offer us a clear and concise synthesis of the concept of the modern nation-state, asserting:
“The legislative systems of the modern
nation-state are characterized by complete independence from ideology of any
kind. If the secular state aims to separate the political structure from the
religious apparatus, then the modern nation-state is an independent state that
relies on no source of legislation outside the popular will. As a neutral
entity regarding religions, sects, ideologies, individuals and classes, this
state seeks to avoid adopting any ideology that might affect its entity and
existence, making it an exclusive state that serves one specific group to the
detriment of another. This "exclusive service" that the state will
seek to provide is based on principles that conflict with the principles of
equality of citizenship and is carried out on the basis of a specific
religious, ideological or doctrinal reference”.
In reality, the
modern nation-state rests on three fundamental principles: the first is the
equality of citizens, the second is the rule of law, and the third is the
legitimacy of the people.
This is not the place to talk about the birth and
construction of the "modern nation-state", to which we have dedicated
a book and several articles [2], but it
is necessary to constantly remind ourselves that this birth is the fruit of a
long historical process which enabled Europe, for example, to emerge from its
sectarian and religious wars, which cost Germany alone, during the Thirty
Years' War (1618-1648), the lives of more than seven million inhabitants. In
the Eastern Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire went out of history and geography
only after writing its last pages with the genocide of the Armenians and
Assyro-Chaldeans in 1916-1918, and the defeat in the First World War and the
signing by Sultan Mehmet VI of the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which left the
Caliphate, at the end of its existence, 380,000 km² of its pre-war 1,780,000
km².
In Egypt, the revolution of 1919 marked an important
turning point in the struggle for national liberation from the British colonial
yoke, victorious in the Second World War. In Damascus, the independence of the
Syrian Arab Kingdom was proclaimed on March 8, 1920 by a constituent
legislative assembly known as the "General Syrian Conference", which
adopted the "Fundamental Statute" that provided for a civil
constitutional monarchy, decentralized administration, guaranteed political and
economic freedoms, the rights of religious communities, equality between
citizens and the holding of free elections to the Council of Representatives by
secret ballot in two rounds (article 73). Elections were free and the
government had no right to intervene or oppose them (article 77).
The French colonial power could not tolerate the idea
of independence, and its forces entered Syria. Three days after the Battle of
Maysaloun, the occupying forces occupied Damascus, exiled King Faisal and
desolated the kingdom on July 28, 2020.
Emad Hajjaj
After the tragic and grotesque fall of the Ottoman caliphate, no one could speak of a caliphate or an Islamic state according to hereditary, medieval sultanic logic. In several Muslim countries, political and social organizations emerged, calling for the construction of an Islamic state. If Hassan al-Banna is the most famous in the Arabic-speaking world, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi occupied center stage in the Islamic world. Abu al-Alaa was a keen observer and connoisseur of the characteristics of the times in which Muslims lived in the Indian peninsula, but also of the rise of totalitarian ideological currents on a global scale - Stalinism in the East, Nazism and Fascism in the West. The imprint of these currents can be clearly seen in al-Mawdudi's definition of the Islamic State:
-
"The Islamic state is a state run by a particular party that believes in a
particular doctrine. Anyone who accepts Islam can become a member of the party
that has been founded to run this state, and those who do not accept it are not
allowed to intervene in state affairs and can live within the state's borders
as dhimmis."
-
"The Islamic State is a totalitarian state that governs all aspects of
life." (Al-Mawdudi writes this in English, in addition to Urdu and
Arabic).
- God has
endowed man with these limits, an independent system and a universal
constitution that admits of no change or modification.... If you wish, you can
evade it and declare war, as Turkey and Iran have done, but you cannot make the
slightest alteration to it, for it is an eternal divine constitution that
cannot be changed or modified."[3]
We see in these three points the common family tree of
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Khomeinists, the jihadi Salafists, the Srourists
(followers of Sheikh Srour from the Daraa region) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir
(Liberation Party), for the principles set out by Mawdudi are all to be found
there, with a few differences in literary expression or a few uncontested phrases.
If the first version of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Syrian model of
Dr. Mustafa al-Sibai did not adhere to the logic of the "sacred
party", or what Khomeini calls in his book "Islamic Government":
"the sacred band", we had to wait for Sayyid Qutb to see a
clearer identification between these components.
The rise of "public religion" and the fall
of contemporary ideologies have had a considerable impact on the rise,
extremism and radicalization of Islamic political movements. The fabrication of
the enemy has played a key role in the introduction of takfir (defining the boundaries between believer and
disbeliever, between pagan and Islamic society), prohibition (lumping together
everything that is forbidden, prohibited and reprehensible) and destruction
(considering jihad or sacred violence as the only way to establish God's reign
on earth). As Yassin al-Haj Saleh puts it: "In Afghanistan, the enemy was
the Soviet Union, then the USA; in Iraq, it was the Americans and their allies
in the Shiite organizations; in Syria, the enemy was essentially the revolution"[4].
At Cairo Stadium on June 15, 2013, Egyptian President
Mohamed Morsi was present in person to announce the results of the first
enlarged meeting between Salafist "scholars", Muslim Brotherhood
"scholars" and leaders of the World Union of Muslim Ulemas, at which
it was unanimously decided to declare jihad in Syria. To announce the results
of this meeting and proclaim its decision, the participants appointed the
Egyptian Sheikh Mohamed Hassan:
"The pure land of Egypt hosted a conference
attended by nearly 500 scholars, belonging to more than 70 bodies,
organizations and associations. These scholars issued a fatwa and agreed that
jihad is a duty of life, wealth and arms, each according to his means. The
jihad to defend blood and honor is now an individual duty for the Syrian people
and a collective duty for Muslims the world over. This is what we owe to the
Lord of heaven and earth" [5].
Since then, the differences between so-called moderate
or political Islam and Salafist jihadist theses have disappeared, and "legitimizing"
the presence of foreign fighters in Syria was processed through the greatest
collective fatwa in contemporary Islamic history. Syrian Muslims, whatever
their factions and orientations, are no longer masters of their present and
future in the conflict between a corrupt dictatorship and the largest popular
movement facing it. The massive arrival of over 120,000 non-Syrian fighters
from some sixty countries, with financial, material and logistical facilities
that have surpassed anything we have seen in the Afghan experience, has
constituted a complete change in the nature, geography and objectives of armed
conflict and infighting, as well as in the nature of the state desired for
change.
Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the caliphate, seen as the
longed-for righteous Islamic State, and conflict within jihadist formations
intensified, leading to bloody clashes that are rarely echoed by supporters of
the "Islamic Liberation Commission in Syria" (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).
If the great split between the Islamic State in Iraq and the al-Nosra Front has
had its share of attention and study, the "Sahwa" has been one of the
boldest and most cultured movements among Syrian jihadists, when Hassan Abboud,
leader of the Ahrar al-Sham movement, aided by the young Mohammed al-Shami,
drafted "The Revolutionary Charter of Honor", one of the most
important revisions in the history of "Salafist jihadism" in Syria.
This charter clarified the boundaries between the general theses of the
Salafist jihadist movement and the Syrian jihadist project for change on
essential points, which go beyond the struggle for power and authority to touch
on the very conception of the desired state:
"- The political aim of the armed Syrian
revolution is to overthrow the regime with all its symbols and pillars and
bring it to justice, far from any revenge or settling of scores.
- The revolution militarily targets the Syrian regime,
which has exercised terrorism against our people with its regular and irregular
military forces and those who support them, such as Iranian mercenaries,
Hezbollah and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, as well as all those who
aggress and apostatize our people, such as Daesh. Military action is limited to
Syrian territory.
- The overthrow of the regime is a joint undertaking
of the various revolutionary forces. Aware of the regional and international
dimension of the Syrian crisis, we are open to meeting and cooperating with
regional and international actors in solidarity with the Syrian people, in the
interests of the revolution.
- Preserving the unity of Syrian territory and
preventing any plans for partition by all available means is a non-negotiable
revolutionary principle.
- Our revolutionary force relies in its military
action on the Syrian element and is convinced of the need for a purely Syrian
political and military decision, rejecting any dependence on foreigners.
- The Syrian people aspire to the establishment of a
state of justice, law and freedoms, free from pressure and diktats.
- The Syrian revolution is a moral and ethical
revolution that aims to establish freedom, justice and security for Syrian
society in all its ethnic and religious diversity.
- The Syrian revolution is committed to respecting the
human rights preached by our religion."[6]
Clearly, the Syrian "Islamic Front" decided
that day to break with what it called the "global jihad" or what the
al-Nosra Front called the "Sunni jihad". [7] in Syria.
Not surprisingly, forty-five members of its leadership were mass-murdered in
the largest attack in fourteen years of revolution and war on Syrian territory,
and evidence revealed years later the involvement of the "al-Nosra
Front" in collaboration with the Turkish secret service (MIT) in the
massacre.
I always dwell on this important document, because it
shows and explains the difference between the al-Nosra Front and its offshoots,
from the Levant Conquest Front to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the jihadist
factions that have adopted the state of justice, law and freedoms in this pact.
Another major bone of contention between the al-Nosra
Front and other Syrian organizations was the adoption by the al-Nosra Front and
Daesh of an approach aimed at integrating foreign fighters into organizational
structures and positions of responsibility. As the al-Nosra Front was made up
of Syrians and foreigners, then joined by some inmates of Sednaya prison, its
command and religious leaders remained in the hands of non-Syrians, with a few
Syrians. In the early years of its existence, Syrians accounted for over 70% of
its membership and held most of the decision-making positions. This became
clear when Hassan Abboud declared on Al-Jazeera that he feared the
harmful role of foreign jihadists: "We don't need non-Syrian elements, we
have enough Syrian fighters, especially as many immigrants have fallen victim
to misinformation and their initial support has turned into a curse". He made
it a condition of any dialogue with al-Nosra that it disassociate itself from
al-Qaeda, stressing that "the decision must be purely Syrian".
The al-Nosra Front responded: "We at the
al-Nosra Front categorically and unambiguously reject any minimization or
concealment of the role of the immigrant brothers in this blessed jihad. They
have played an immense and important role in supporting the people of Syria, in
accordance with God's word: {And if they ask you for help in religion, you must
help them} We will respond to them only with benevolence and gratitude, for our
Lord, the Merciful, has said: {Is good repaid with anything other than good?} We
are united with Muslims by religious brotherhood that transcends any
territorial or national ties, and our support for Muslims is based on religion
and loyalty to it, not on homeland, land and loyalty to it, for Allah, the
Almighty, has said: {And why should you not fight in the way of Allah, while
men, women, children and infants are oppressed?} And the Prophet (peace and
blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The Muslim is the brother of the
Muslim, he neither deceives nor betrays him". Let everyone know that the
Islamic state we want is a state founded above all on religion, faith and
Sharia law, and it is to this that we owe our loyalty and allegiance. For us, a
Muslim is not the equal of a disbeliever, as Allah has said: {Will we treat
Muslims like criminals?} And the Prophet (pbuh) said: "The strongest bond
of faith is to love for Allah and hate for Allah." What harms our migrant
brothers harms us, what affects them affects us, and whoever criticizes them
criticizes us. O migrants, this land of Syria is vast, settle in it, and
Syria's doors will remain wide open to all those who want to support her and do
good for her and her people".
The al-Nosra Front has gone from strength to strength,
constantly relying on a high percentage of foreign fighters. The words
"Syrian" and "Syria" are absent from its publications and
leaflets. In its textbooks, schools and the positions of its religious leaders,
it has drawn on the most extreme and radical jihadist writings and positions on
the Syrian national question. Even in his experience in power in Idlib, clerics
and security officials were the real decision-makers in the government, army,
security services, religious police and intervention in people's daily lives.
When we look at the speeches and writings of the Syrian figures of Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham, we see that they only repeat and reiterate what was said in Abu Musab
al-Suri's (Mustafa Set Mariam Nassar) "Call to Global Islamic
Resistance", "Issues of jurisprudence relating to jihad " by Abu
Abdallah al-Muhajir (Abu Rahman al-Ali), " Managing
barbarism" by Abu Bakr Naji (Mohammed Khalil al-Hakim) and " Jihad and ijtihad " by Abu Qatada al-Filistini.
We understand why Hassan Abboud describes them as follows: "Young people
with futile dreams, with no knowledge of religion or the Sharia".
