HAYTHAM MANNA The Julanic Statelet* or the putrid secretions of jihadist totalitarianism

*Our translation of Douila al-Julani in Arabic, literally the micro-state of al-Julani

Haytham Manna, 28/4/2025

دويلة الجولاني: أو الإفرازات الرثة للشمولية الجهادي Original

Translated by Tlaxcala

Haytham Manna (Umm El Mayadhin, Daraa, 1951), physician and anthropologist, is a historic activist for the cause of peoples and human rights. Director of the Scandinavian Institute for Human Rights/Haytham Manna Foundation in Geneva and President of the International Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights (IMHPR), he is the author of some sixty books. Below is chapter 2 of his forthcoming book “Manifesto against Jihadi Fascism”. [chapter 1 chapter 3]

 

In their essay entitled "The modern nation-state: between Islamism and secularism", Asia Al-Muhtar and Adnan Harawi offer us a clear and concise synthesis of the concept of the modern nation-state, asserting:

“The legislative systems of the modern nation-state are characterized by complete independence from ideology of any kind. If the secular state aims to separate the political structure from the religious apparatus, then the modern nation-state is an independent state that relies on no source of legislation outside the popular will. As a neutral entity regarding religions, sects, ideologies, individuals and classes, this state seeks to avoid adopting any ideology that might affect its entity and existence, making it an exclusive state that serves one specific group to the detriment of another. This "exclusive service" that the state will seek to provide is based on principles that conflict with the principles of equality of citizenship and is carried out on the basis of a specific religious, ideological or doctrinal reference”.

 In reality, the modern nation-state rests on three fundamental principles: the first is the equality of citizens, the second is the rule of law, and the third is the legitimacy of the people.

This is not the place to talk about the birth and construction of the "modern nation-state", to which we have dedicated a book and several articles [2], but it is necessary to constantly remind ourselves that this birth is the fruit of a long historical process which enabled Europe, for example, to emerge from its sectarian and religious wars, which cost Germany alone, during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the lives of more than seven million inhabitants. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire went out of history and geography only after writing its last pages with the genocide of the Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans in 1916-1918, and the defeat in the First World War and the signing by Sultan Mehmet VI of the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which left the Caliphate, at the end of its existence, 380,000 km² of its pre-war 1,780,000 km².

In Egypt, the revolution of 1919 marked an important turning point in the struggle for national liberation from the British colonial yoke, victorious in the Second World War. In Damascus, the independence of the Syrian Arab Kingdom was proclaimed on March 8, 1920 by a constituent legislative assembly known as the "General Syrian Conference", which adopted the "Fundamental Statute" that provided for a civil constitutional monarchy, decentralized administration, guaranteed political and economic freedoms, the rights of religious communities, equality between citizens and the holding of free elections to the Council of Representatives by secret ballot in two rounds (article 73). Elections were free and the government had no right to intervene or oppose them (article 77).

The French colonial power could not tolerate the idea of independence, and its forces entered Syria. Three days after the Battle of Maysaloun, the occupying forces occupied Damascus, exiled King Faisal and desolated the kingdom on July 28, 2020.

Emad Hajjaj

After the tragic and grotesque fall of the Ottoman caliphate, no one could speak of a caliphate or an Islamic state according to hereditary, medieval sultanic logic. In several Muslim countries, political and social organizations emerged, calling for the construction of an Islamic state. If Hassan al-Banna is the most famous in the Arabic-speaking world, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi occupied center stage in the Islamic world. Abu al-Alaa was a keen observer and connoisseur of the characteristics of the times in which Muslims lived in the Indian peninsula, but also of the rise of totalitarian ideological currents on a global scale - Stalinism in the East, Nazism and Fascism in the West. The imprint of these currents can be clearly seen in al-Mawdudi's definition of the Islamic State:

- "The Islamic state is a state run by a particular party that believes in a particular doctrine. Anyone who accepts Islam can become a member of the party that has been founded to run this state, and those who do not accept it are not allowed to intervene in state affairs and can live within the state's borders as dhimmis."

- "The Islamic State is a totalitarian state that governs all aspects of life." (Al-Mawdudi writes this in English, in addition to Urdu and Arabic).

- God has endowed man with these limits, an independent system and a universal constitution that admits of no change or modification.... If you wish, you can evade it and declare war, as Turkey and Iran have done, but you cannot make the slightest alteration to it, for it is an eternal divine constitution that cannot be changed or modified."[3]

We see in these three points the common family tree of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Khomeinists, the jihadi Salafists, the Srourists (followers of Sheikh Srour from the Daraa region) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), for the principles set out by Mawdudi are all to be found there, with a few differences in literary expression or a few uncontested phrases. If the first version of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Syrian model of Dr. Mustafa al-Sibai did not adhere to the logic of the "sacred party", or what Khomeini calls in his book "Islamic Government": "the sacred band", we had to wait for Sayyid Qutb to see a clearer identification between these components.

The rise of "public religion" and the fall of contemporary ideologies have had a considerable impact on the rise, extremism and radicalization of Islamic political movements. The fabrication of the enemy has played a key role in the introduction of takfir (defining the boundaries between believer and disbeliever, between pagan and Islamic society), prohibition (lumping together everything that is forbidden, prohibited and reprehensible) and destruction (considering jihad or sacred violence as the only way to establish God's reign on earth). As Yassin al-Haj Saleh puts it: "In Afghanistan, the enemy was the Soviet Union, then the USA; in Iraq, it was the Americans and their allies in the Shiite organizations; in Syria, the enemy was essentially the revolution"[4].

At Cairo Stadium on June 15, 2013, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was present in person to announce the results of the first enlarged meeting between Salafist "scholars", Muslim Brotherhood "scholars" and leaders of the World Union of Muslim Ulemas, at which it was unanimously decided to declare jihad in Syria. To announce the results of this meeting and proclaim its decision, the participants appointed the Egyptian Sheikh Mohamed Hassan:

"The pure land of Egypt hosted a conference attended by nearly 500 scholars, belonging to more than 70 bodies, organizations and associations. These scholars issued a fatwa and agreed that jihad is a duty of life, wealth and arms, each according to his means. The jihad to defend blood and honor is now an individual duty for the Syrian people and a collective duty for Muslims the world over. This is what we owe to the Lord of heaven and earth" [5].

Since then, the differences between so-called moderate or political Islam and Salafist jihadist theses have disappeared, and "legitimizing" the presence of foreign fighters in Syria was processed through the greatest collective fatwa in contemporary Islamic history. Syrian Muslims, whatever their factions and orientations, are no longer masters of their present and future in the conflict between a corrupt dictatorship and the largest popular movement facing it. The massive arrival of over 120,000 non-Syrian fighters from some sixty countries, with financial, material and logistical facilities that have surpassed anything we have seen in the Afghan experience, has constituted a complete change in the nature, geography and objectives of armed conflict and infighting, as well as in the nature of the state desired for change.

Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the caliphate, seen as the longed-for righteous Islamic State, and conflict within jihadist formations intensified, leading to bloody clashes that are rarely echoed by supporters of the "Islamic Liberation Commission in Syria" (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). If the great split between the Islamic State in Iraq and the al-Nosra Front has had its share of attention and study, the "Sahwa" has been one of the boldest and most cultured movements among Syrian jihadists, when Hassan Abboud, leader of the Ahrar al-Sham movement, aided by the young Mohammed al-Shami, drafted "The Revolutionary Charter of Honor", one of the most important revisions in the history of "Salafist jihadism" in Syria. This charter clarified the boundaries between the general theses of the Salafist jihadist movement and the Syrian jihadist project for change on essential points, which go beyond the struggle for power and authority to touch on the very conception of the desired state:

"- The political aim of the armed Syrian revolution is to overthrow the regime with all its symbols and pillars and bring it to justice, far from any revenge or settling of scores.

- The revolution militarily targets the Syrian regime, which has exercised terrorism against our people with its regular and irregular military forces and those who support them, such as Iranian mercenaries, Hezbollah and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, as well as all those who aggress and apostatize our people, such as Daesh. Military action is limited to Syrian territory.

- The overthrow of the regime is a joint undertaking of the various revolutionary forces. Aware of the regional and international dimension of the Syrian crisis, we are open to meeting and cooperating with regional and international actors in solidarity with the Syrian people, in the interests of the revolution.

- Preserving the unity of Syrian territory and preventing any plans for partition by all available means is a non-negotiable revolutionary principle.

- Our revolutionary force relies in its military action on the Syrian element and is convinced of the need for a purely Syrian political and military decision, rejecting any dependence on foreigners.

- The Syrian people aspire to the establishment of a state of justice, law and freedoms, free from pressure and diktats.

- The Syrian revolution is a moral and ethical revolution that aims to establish freedom, justice and security for Syrian society in all its ethnic and religious diversity.

- The Syrian revolution is committed to respecting the human rights preached by our religion."[6]

Clearly, the Syrian "Islamic Front" decided that day to break with what it called the "global jihad" or what the al-Nosra Front called the "Sunni jihad". [7] in Syria. Not surprisingly, forty-five members of its leadership were mass-murdered in the largest attack in fourteen years of revolution and war on Syrian territory, and evidence revealed years later the involvement of the "al-Nosra Front" in collaboration with the Turkish secret service (MIT) in the massacre.

I always dwell on this important document, because it shows and explains the difference between the al-Nosra Front and its offshoots, from the Levant Conquest Front to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the jihadist factions that have adopted the state of justice, law and freedoms in this pact.

Another major bone of contention between the al-Nosra Front and other Syrian organizations was the adoption by the al-Nosra Front and Daesh of an approach aimed at integrating foreign fighters into organizational structures and positions of responsibility. As the al-Nosra Front was made up of Syrians and foreigners, then joined by some inmates of Sednaya prison, its command and religious leaders remained in the hands of non-Syrians, with a few Syrians. In the early years of its existence, Syrians accounted for over 70% of its membership and held most of the decision-making positions. This became clear when Hassan Abboud declared on Al-Jazeera that he feared the harmful role of foreign jihadists: "We don't need non-Syrian elements, we have enough Syrian fighters, especially as many immigrants have fallen victim to misinformation and their initial support has turned into a curse". He made it a condition of any dialogue with al-Nosra that it disassociate itself from al-Qaeda, stressing that "the decision must be purely Syrian".

The al-Nosra Front responded: "We at the al-Nosra Front categorically and unambiguously reject any minimization or concealment of the role of the immigrant brothers in this blessed jihad. They have played an immense and important role in supporting the people of Syria, in accordance with God's word: {And if they ask you for help in religion, you must help them} We will respond to them only with benevolence and gratitude, for our Lord, the Merciful, has said: {Is good repaid with anything other than good?} We are united with Muslims by religious brotherhood that transcends any territorial or national ties, and our support for Muslims is based on religion and loyalty to it, not on homeland, land and loyalty to it, for Allah, the Almighty, has said: {And why should you not fight in the way of Allah, while men, women, children and infants are oppressed?} And the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim, he neither deceives nor betrays him". Let everyone know that the Islamic state we want is a state founded above all on religion, faith and Sharia law, and it is to this that we owe our loyalty and allegiance. For us, a Muslim is not the equal of a disbeliever, as Allah has said: {Will we treat Muslims like criminals?} And the Prophet (pbuh) said: "The strongest bond of faith is to love for Allah and hate for Allah." What harms our migrant brothers harms us, what affects them affects us, and whoever criticizes them criticizes us. O migrants, this land of Syria is vast, settle in it, and Syria's doors will remain wide open to all those who want to support her and do good for her and her people".

The al-Nosra Front has gone from strength to strength, constantly relying on a high percentage of foreign fighters. The words "Syrian" and "Syria" are absent from its publications and leaflets. In its textbooks, schools and the positions of its religious leaders, it has drawn on the most extreme and radical jihadist writings and positions on the Syrian national question. Even in his experience in power in Idlib, clerics and security officials were the real decision-makers in the government, army, security services, religious police and intervention in people's daily lives. When we look at the speeches and writings of the Syrian figures of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, we see that they only repeat and reiterate what was said in Abu Musab al-Suri's (Mustafa Set Mariam Nassar) "Call to Global Islamic Resistance", "Issues of jurisprudence relating to jihad " by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (Abu Rahman al-Ali), " Managing barbarism" by Abu Bakr Naji (Mohammed Khalil al-Hakim) and " Jihad and ijtihad " by Abu Qatada al-Filistini. We understand why Hassan Abboud describes them as follows: "Young people with futile dreams, with no knowledge of religion or the Sharia".

Despite the bloody conflict between Daesh and Al-Nosra, it's important to remember that both organizations shared the same vision of the fight against the "international alliance". Anas Khattab wrote a letter on this subject, entitled "The alliance of the servants of the cross against the Mujahideen of the Levant", in which he states:

"The rightful verdict for all those who participated in this crusader coalition against the mujahideen, or called for its participation, or aided it, supported it, backed it, encouraged it, approved of it, wished for its victory over the mujahideen, or called for its victory, or showed allegiance to it, whether materially or morally, even in its heart.... The verdict for those who have done so is that they are apostate disbelievers who have left the religion of Islam and have no dignity, whether they are members of a so-called "fighting" group, sheikhs or men of the Muslim people."[8]

The declaration of "rupture" between al-Qaeda and the "Al-Nosra Front", under pressure from Qatar and Turkey, was merely a change of name (Levant Conquest Front then Levant Liberation Commission) without any change in structure, function or program. The Al-Nosra Front's new clothes have not changed the new organization's behavior and actions, either politically or socially. The messages, pamphlets and fatwas of the "Syrian Liberation Council" continue to be taught in camps and schools, the slogans of the "Sunni jihad" remain unchanged, and the legitimists still have the last word in the "Emirate of Idlib". We observe in the seven governments of the "National Salvation Front" an attempt to build an administrative structure for the mini-state, in which the "Committee for the Liberation of Syria" controls everything to do with justice, the army, security, religious property and the economy, with a front cover provided by independent figures who adopt the Committee's approach. "HTS has built the largest number of prisons and detention centers in the northwest (twelve prisons and one detention center) in the areas it controls, and controls all aspects of public life, as well as sources of income, employment and funding, through its hypertrophied security apparatus. (An entire chapter is devoted to this subject in the book).

Paresh

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has not changed one iota the theses of the al-Nosra Front: the war in Syria is a sectarian and confessional war, the enemy is the Alawite regime, the Alawites and the Shiites and their allies, but also the "enemy" who speaks of a national and democratic state... Talking about women's rights is an "imitation of the West", and the strict Taliban-style separation of men and women is a legal duty enforced by the "religious police" (who order what is right and forbid what is wrong!)... Messages forbidding music, singing and theater are even broadcast at Idlib University [9]... As for regional and international alliances and enmities, anything goes, and at the same time, anything can be discussed, even with the "alliance of the worshippers of the cross". It is this behavioral schizophrenia that today constitutes a danger for Syrian society.

In terms of "jihadist security", the war against an entire community continues, seen as the symbol and expression of an unpunished "resurgence". In the army, police and security services, anyone who might pose a threat to the "security of the Sunni jihad" is dismissed, arrested or even murdered. This is evident in these apparatuses and in the way the new command applies the doctrine of "cleansing" the army and security from all "non-Muslims". In "General" Anas Khattab's letter, "Rules for belonging to armies and national groups", we see that this doctrine applies even to dissident officers who sacrificed everything they had to defend their people and whose future is now being decided, here in Egypt and over there in Turkey, after being tested on "their degree of commitment and knowledge of the true religion". Have we forgotten the virulent attack by Marhaf Abu Qasra (Abu Hassan al-Hamwi) and Anas Khattab (Abu Ahmad Hudoud) against all those calling for the creation of a non-partisan, non-sectarian Syrian national army? And the messages distributed to Damascus Liberation Group fighters by the vice-chief of the HTS and the head of the security services and current Minister of the Interior:

"Nationality makes the sons and daughters of the same country equal in rights and duties, whatever their religion. Christians, Jews, atheists and apostates have the same rights as Muslims!

For example, access to the civil service is a general right for all citizens, whatever their religion, even if they are atheists or apostates, whereas in Islam, it is allowed only to Muslims, or even only to virtuous Muslims".

He adds, "Patriotism is a philosophical doctrine that contradicts the Islamic religion, so it is not permissible to believe in it or affiliate with it, either in truth or to deceive the enemy, although the judgment is not the same in both cases, the former being considered apostasy and the latter a prohibition[10]."

It was necessary to revisit these events and positions to understand the nature of the structural and functional changes undergone by the "al-Nosra Front", which led it to eliminate all Syrian fighting factions (whether or not they were affiliated to al-Baghdadi, then to al-Zawahiri, before severing their links with al-Qaeda). It has not changed or modified its nature, its fatwas and its positions on the question of integrating foreign fighters, which it considers an essential part of its structure and project, nor on its declared hostility to the national state and Syrian membership. Despite all forms of popular discontent with foreign fighters and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's stance towards minorities, particularly the Alawite community, Al Joulani's government, army and security forces have not listened to advice, even from cosmetic surgery "specialists" striving to give a different image of themselves from the centers of Doha, MIT, HD and MI6. For any approach to the question of equal civil rights for all Syrian men and women is tantamount to undermining the doctrine on which its fighters, "migrants and partisans" have been raised, while diverting them from their historic mission of cleansing the Levant of all non-Sunnis.

When it's difficult for HTS to find a Damascene or Halabi (Sunni) cleric to deliver the Friday sermon in a Damascus mosque, he calls on a "Maghrebi" for this mission to teach the inhabitants of the Levant their religion: "Imagine that God's best creatures are on Syrian soil, and among us, these impure ones. No sect can divide our ranks. Syria is Sunni and will remain so, and it will remain Muslim with God's help. We stood up, we took up arms and we said: "At your service, O God". We are the people of combat, we are the people of oppression, we are the people of struggle, we are the people of sacrifice, the people of the Sunna, my brothers. Now they must unite, come together and learn who their enemies are. If we see the flame of discord ignited in Damascus, we will fight it, with God's help. So, are you ready for jihad? Are you ready for any battle?... Takbir... Takbir [11]" ... The military and religious bloc absolutely loyal to Ahmed al-Sharaa is ultimately made up of non-Syrian factions led by the Syrian Liberation Council. Many Syrian leaders have left the movement, resigned or been imprisoned, while all foreign members of the HTS and its allies see their affiliation as linked to their destiny and future.

In this pathological configuration of the new power, the problem of new friendships and new enmities arises after the defeat of the so-called Axis of Resistance, which, according to one of the first legitimizers of the "al-Nosra Front", the Jordanian Jihadist Salafist Sami al-Dridi: "It is no secret to anyone who follows the events of the conflict between the people of truth and the people of lies that the criminals have shown great cunning. Their cunning consisted, in the past, in supporting this criminal regime in its war against the Muslims of this country, and they divided up the roles in this enterprise... But when they saw that their interest at this stage was to overthrow the regime, they turned their ruse into a plot to overthrow it in order to serve their interests and projects in the struggle against the truth and its supporters, which is not lost on anyone who follows events."[12].

For the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, which played the most important roles in the continuation and demise of Assad's rule, the coming to power of the "Jihadist Salafist League" means, above all, shedding the spectre of the values and rhetoric that terrified pseudo-republics, royalties and emirates... And the region's entry into an era where talk of state sovereignty, a society of equal citizens and democratic transition is considered heresy and apostasy... So it's hardly surprising that these governments have such a narrow vision and deliberate blindness to the nature and practices of the new power, incapable of building a state, social peace and human security, and a generator of sectarian and civil wars? And their rapid normalization of what they themselves called "terrorism", in the space of little more than a decade.

Didn't this terrorism "liberate" them from those it had for decades considered its main enemy in the region?

Notes

[2] For more information, see : Bina al-Muwatana (Building Citizenship), Haytham Manna, Éditions Bisan, Beirut

[3] Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, The Theory of Islam and its Message, 3rd edition, Dar al-Fikr, 1967, p. 47. The conference dates back to the 1930s, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Stalinist purges. The quotation is taken from the "revised" edition published after the 1967 war.

[4] Yassin al-Haj Saleh, The Powerless Imperialists, Riyad al-Rayyes for Books and Publishing, Beirut, 2019, p. 20.

[5] Haytham Manna, The decline of political Islam, from al-Mawdudi to Erdoğan, Nofal/Hachet Antoine, Beirut, 2021, p. 89.

[6] This document was signed by the Islamic Union of Levant Fighters, the Levant Fighters Corps, the Mujahideen Army, the Quran Brigades and the Islamic Front. It was published on May 17, 2014. To read the full text, see: Haytham Manna, Front al-Nusra, Bisan, Beirut, pp. 185-194.

[7] The attack on the "Pact/Charter of Revolutionary Honor" was first launched by non-Syrian "legalists", such as Abu Qatada and Sami al-Dridi, among others, then joined by Syrians from the al-Nosra Front, where Abdel Rahim Atoun described the text as a "pact of apostasy". This was also the position of Abu Faras al-Suri, who published an article entitled "Al-Nazir al-Aryan" (The Naked Warner), in which he alluded to the apostasy of Ahrar al-Sham and certain Syrian factions, considering the "pact of revolutionary honor" to be a misplaced document, a position adopted by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani and Abu Maria al-Qahtani. However, press release no. 9 issued by the al-Nosra Front concerning the "pact of revolutionary honor" emphasized "the need to clear the jihad of errors committed" without declaring Ahrar al-Sham members apostates.

[8] Anas Khattab, "The alliance of the worshippers of the cross against the mujahideen of Syria, advice and guidance", October 2014: https://ketabonline.com/ar/books/20257/read?part=1&page=2&index=4370535

[9] It is necessary to read Anas Khattab's letter, "Letter on the Judgment of Music", to understand the narrow-mindedness and obscurantism of the Minister of the Interior, the head of the secret services and the member of the Supreme National Security Council in Syria today!

[10] Anas Khattab, "Judgment on membership of armies and national groups". There is a great similarity between the position of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members on this issue and Abdel Rahim Atoun's speeches and lectures, which constantly emphasize the "unholy character of democracy" and shallow, desperate critiques of national and secular concepts of the state, with more rhetorical than analytical criticism of socialist, capitalist and communist modes of government. Here are a few examples of these positions:

https://ketabonline.com/ar/books/106868/read?part=1&page=91&index=4685192, https://www.noonpost.com/304248/

[11] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=saved&v=2484450595237246

[12] Sami Al-Aridi, Letter on the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's tyrannical regime, Jamada Al-Akhira 1446.