HAYTHAM MANNA Syria: The Law of the Jungle

 Haytham Manna , 4/5/2025
Original : شريعة الغاب

Translated by Tlaxcala

Below is Chapter 3 of the forthcoming book “Manifesto Against Jihadist Fascism”. [chapter 1 chapter 2 ]

When we read a “message on the judgment of music” from the new Minister of Interior of Damascus, Anas Khattab, we realize that our problem in Syria today is not about returning to “the law of God,” but about triumphantly returning to the law of the jungle. Indeed, from the creator of the terms “Sunni jihad” and “cult of jihad,” we read:

“The musical instruments are the cause of earthquakes, transformations, and tremors... This consensus has been reported by Al-Qurtubi, Ibn Rajab, Ibn Salah, Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, and others... And the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya, may God have mercy on him, said: “Whoever practices these amusements for a religious purpose and to draw closer to God, there is no doubt about his misguidance and ignorance.” “As for the one who does it for pleasure and entertainment, the schools of the four imams agree that all musical instruments are prohibited, for it has been established in Sahih al-Bukhari and elsewhere that the Prophet, peace be upon him, informed that there would be among his community those who would make permissible silk, alcohol, and musical instruments, and he mentioned that they would be transformed into monkeys and pigs.” “Musical instruments are amusements, as mentioned by the people of the language; the plural of instrument (ma'azifah) is the tool with which one plays: that is, with which one makes noise, and none of the followers of the imams has disputed the prohibition of musical instruments”...

I thank God that my believing mother, who was diligent in praying, fasting, performing pilgrimage, and giving zakat, played the lute for us when we returned from visiting my imprisoned father*, to lighten our sorrow, and that she taught mathematics and natural sciences to more than one generation. She left us before seeing and hearing what we see and read today, coming from those whom Hassan Aboud, the founder of the Ahrar al-Sham movement in Syria, called “newcomers, children of youth, devoid of wisdom, without knowledge of religion or legitimate politics.”

“Urgent - Cleaning in Progress”: Al-Jazeera, Al-Joulani’s Washing Machine

Drawing by Adnan al-Mahakri, Yemen

The problem with the takfiris is not limited to their rejection of music, thought, and poetry, nor to their consideration of any cultural disagreement as a danger to ‘’ahl al-sunnah, “the people of the sunnah." It goes beyond that, touching on their overall vision of man, Islam, political systems, and human groups. They odiously repeat a famous verse attributed to Imam Al-Shafi'i:

“All knowledge outside of the Quran is a distraction... Except for the teaching of hadiths and religious jurisprudence.”

“Knowledge is what contains the narrative ‘We have heard’... Everything else is merely suggestions from demons.” 

Regarding political systems, there are constant criticisms of Muslim reformers such as:

“We have seen them permit democracy in the name of consultation... They lie!

Before that, they permitted socialism...

And they allowed legislation outside of Allah and the creation of political parties under the pretext of applying sharia... They claim!

And they permitted a woman and a Christian to govern Muslims...

And they forbade rebellion against the ruler without what Allah has revealed...

And they considered secularists, communists, liberals, socialists, and others to be believing Muslims!

And they regarded Christians as brothers of Muslims...

And they allowed the American occupation of Afghanistan!!!

And some of them permitted attending the mass of infidel Christians and congratulating them on the appointment of their popes!!

And some of them allowed men to shave their beards...

And some of them allowed women to wear pants...

And other innovations and misguidances that they spread among Muslims as certainties in the religion of Islam... And Allah is sufficient for us, and He is our best protector.”

 

What is Sunni Jihad?

Anas Khattab responds: “Jihad, in addition to being an act of worship, is also one of the individual's activities in life. The history of humanity and its contemporary reality testify that human beings must fight others, regardless of the reason or motivation for that fight...! Islam has come to orient this fight and classify it among acts of worship.” 

For the takfiris, the destiny of man is to fight others, and this “other” can be fabricated as needed. It is called "Nusayri" in Syria, "Christian" or "Shia n other countries, and "misguided sects" elsewhere. The concept expands and contracts according to needs, and it only takes a European caricaturist or a carefully prepared falsified recording of a person purportedly belonging to the Druze unitarian sect to ignite war. The people are easily mobilized, and historians often have enough examples to cite. Those whose rights to knowledge, work, and culture have been trampled mobilize to defend "the religion," "the Prophet," and "the dogma." They move like wolves towards their kind to liberate themselves from those their claws can reach, in support of God and His Prophet.

This reminds us of the story recounted by Yaqout al-Hamawi in his “Dictionary of Cities”: “The inhabitants of the city were three groups: the Shafi'is, who were the fewest, the Hanafis, who were the most numerous, and the Shiites, who constituted the majority... The rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites intensified, and the Hanafis and Shafi'is united against them. Wars broke out, all victorious for the Shafi'is, despite their small number. But God supported them. The inhabitants of Rustaq, who were Hanafis, came to the city armed and supported their co-religionists, but it brought them nothing, until they were exterminated. These ruined places you see are the places of the Shiites and Hanafis, while the neighborhood known for the Shafi'is remains. And only those who hide their doctrine remain among the Shiites and Hanafis.”[4]

Erdoğan the Puppeteer, by Adnan Al Mahakri

Since the birth of “Jabhat al-Nusra” under the command of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the main slogans they have expressed are: "Democracy is a sin and disbelief," "Christians must be pursued in Beirut, and the Nusayris to their coffins." The jihad in Syria and for Syria is "against the Nusayris and their allies," "against the Nusayri regime and the Shiite militias," and in support of the people of the sunnah. Funds have flowed from all Gulf countries to this group, reaching "wasted" amounts of a billion dollars during its third year, according to Abu Mohammed al-Joulani. This was also an opportunity for Gulf countries to rid themselves of those they had failed to rehabilitate among the Guantanamo detainees and Al-Qaeda prisoners, with the Saudi intelligence director Bandar bin Sultan taking charge of eliminating them in the Syrian furnace. This also provided an opportunity to send Salafists from the Maghreb to the East! However, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the then head of Turkey's MIT (National Intelligence Organization), Hakan Fidan, viewed it as an opportunity to steer "Sunni Islam" and seize Gulf funds. The result was that what they had imagined as a one or two-year stroll turned into a nightmare with the arrival of the largest wave of Syrian refugees onto Turkish soil. Despite this, the Turkish government managed to make substantial economic and geopolitical investments in the Syrian tragedy, and this continues to this day.

Hakan Fidan and Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on December 24, 2025

The opening of Turkish borders to tens of thousands of non-Syrian fighters for jihad completely changed the map of forces opposed to the Syrian dictatorial regime. Democratic voices were marginalized, and mentioning the slogan of the Syrian revolution “The Syrian people are one” became blasphemy and heresy, to the point that words like "people," "freedom," "sovereignty," and "national state" are now fought against and provoke attacks from armed opposition factions. 

With the takeover of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham over a significant part of Idlib province, serious work began to "cleanse" the city of anyone who differed from "Jabhat al-Nusra" in lifestyle and habits... Sanctions were imposed against "deviants and violations," leading to the exile of a third of the population. In some villages, jihadist complexes were established according to the fighters' country of origin, such as for the Uyghurs, Chechens, and Moroccans... Even French individuals settled where those who were expelled or forced to flee had lived. It is ironic that those who fled social reforms in Saudi Arabia brought with them the memories of the “Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” to Idlib, with generous funding from Wahhabi “charity” organizations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to propagate the wearing of the niqab, prohibit mixing in restaurants and offices, and prevent the presence of unaccompanied women in shops. 

Additionally, it was also forbidden to sell women's clothing to men and to monitor wedding halls and festive events to prohibit “immoral behaviors,” as well as the public consumption of shisha in streets, shops, and restaurants. They also prohibited exaggerated haircuts and “inappropriate behaviors,” monitoring young girls and boys in educational institutes and public transport.

After the "jurists" and "jihadists" began wearing ties, the euphoria reached several disillusioned individuals who thought that people had forgotten them; however, they began to speak of "Sunni oppression" and sought the merits of those who "liberated and decided." They forgot that a snake changing its skin does not remove the venom from its bites. The attack on the coastal region revealed the instinctual nature of those who became the new power in Damascus. Nawar Jabour describes the tragedy of sectarian cleansing by saying: “The massacres that took place on the coast added a dimension where the Alawites became an explicit enemy, killed and filmed dead, their shops and lands set ablaze, and they were pursued even when fleeing to the forests or valleys. But what was even more cruel was the ritualized murder or inspired killings, where the murderers ensured that the massacres were executed according to what had been religiously prescribed against the 'Nusayris,' which consecrated the religious character of the violence, so that the message was not only directed at the victims, but their very bodies became a political and religious message. The murder was not merely an act of senseless violence; videos circulated documenting celebratory murders, where the goal was not just to physically eliminate the victims, but to boast about destroying their properties and stealing them. An open bragging about the looting of the homes of the slain, with fighters brandishing the belongings of the inhabitants as spoils, illustrating the pride in theft—just as Syrians had previously observed with the soldiers of the fallen regime and the national defence militias. The murdered victims became symbols of the victory of faith, wherein the sacred duty of purification manifested itself on the bodies left dead and abandoned for all to see, solidifying a long-term image that they are politically, religiously, and spiritually rejected.”

To this day, the authority of Ahmad al-Sharaa has not issued any clear decision to put an end to the aggressions affecting the lands, properties, and the right to security of the Alawites as such!

It is difficult to determine who fabricated an audio recording and attributed it to a Syrian from the Druze community, but it is easy to follow the reactions among those who are now officially defined as “undisciplined elements and factions.” With a stroke of genius, and in the name of defending the Prophet Muhammad, the Quranic verse “No one bears the burden of another” was modified in the minds of the crowds (without the “no”), and the Party of Mobilization and Hatred directed itself towards the miniature Syria (Jaramana) to take revenge on its inhabitants in an affair that did not concern them. The number of victims in this collective madness exceeded one hundred, with dozens of detainees and missing persons.

Is it not the party of the three “T’s” (takfir, tahreem, and tafjir, التكفير والتحريم والتفجير) that truly holds power over the security and military authorities today? Can Ahmad Al-Sharaa address criticisms or complaints to those he appointed to the National Security Council, an authority above all? Is there anyone among them, including the new head of intelligence, whose hands are not stained with the blood of Syrians?

Can a reasonable person today believe that the “transitional authority” in Damascus wants to build a Syria for all Syrians? 

Transl. Note

*Yousef Alawdat, a lawyer, was imprisoned for 18 years under the Assad regime. 

Transl. Note
* Yousef Alawdat, a lawyer, was imprisoned for 18 years under the Assad regime

Notes

[1] https://t.ly/NoHFs 

[2] Anas Khattab, ibid, although this passage is plagiarized from several other texts without mentioning the other sources.

[3] https://t.ly/8g1_F  (Sunni jihad and the paths of deviation).

[4] See Yaqout al-Hamawi, Lexicon of Countries, 3/117; also see: The Phenomenon of Fanaticism Throughout Islamic History, Muhammad Amjad Abdul Razzaq al-Bayat, 2018, Dar al-Maymana, Medina.

[5]  https://t.ly/v4Lgr 

[6]  https://t.ly/rNEt1 

[7] https://t.ly/_i1Bg  https://t.ly/rPfmR 

HAYTHAM MANNA The Julanic Statelet* or the putrid secretions of jihadist totalitarianism

*Our translation of Douila al-Julani in Arabic, literally the micro-state of al-Julani

Haytham Manna, 28/4/2025

دويلة الجولاني: أو الإفرازات الرثة للشمولية الجهادي Original

Translated by Tlaxcala

Haytham Manna (Umm El Mayadhin, Daraa, 1951), physician and anthropologist, is a historic activist for the cause of peoples and human rights. Director of the Scandinavian Institute for Human Rights/Haytham Manna Foundation in Geneva and President of the International Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights (IMHPR), he is the author of some sixty books. Below is chapter 2 of his forthcoming book “Manifesto against Jihadi Fascism”. [chapter 1 chapter 3]

 

In their essay entitled "The modern nation-state: between Islamism and secularism", Asia Al-Muhtar and Adnan Harawi offer us a clear and concise synthesis of the concept of the modern nation-state, asserting:

“The legislative systems of the modern nation-state are characterized by complete independence from ideology of any kind. If the secular state aims to separate the political structure from the religious apparatus, then the modern nation-state is an independent state that relies on no source of legislation outside the popular will. As a neutral entity regarding religions, sects, ideologies, individuals and classes, this state seeks to avoid adopting any ideology that might affect its entity and existence, making it an exclusive state that serves one specific group to the detriment of another. This "exclusive service" that the state will seek to provide is based on principles that conflict with the principles of equality of citizenship and is carried out on the basis of a specific religious, ideological or doctrinal reference”.

 In reality, the modern nation-state rests on three fundamental principles: the first is the equality of citizens, the second is the rule of law, and the third is the legitimacy of the people.

This is not the place to talk about the birth and construction of the "modern nation-state", to which we have dedicated a book and several articles [2], but it is necessary to constantly remind ourselves that this birth is the fruit of a long historical process which enabled Europe, for example, to emerge from its sectarian and religious wars, which cost Germany alone, during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the lives of more than seven million inhabitants. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire went out of history and geography only after writing its last pages with the genocide of the Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans in 1916-1918, and the defeat in the First World War and the signing by Sultan Mehmet VI of the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which left the Caliphate, at the end of its existence, 380,000 km² of its pre-war 1,780,000 km².

In Egypt, the revolution of 1919 marked an important turning point in the struggle for national liberation from the British colonial yoke, victorious in the Second World War. In Damascus, the independence of the Syrian Arab Kingdom was proclaimed on March 8, 1920 by a constituent legislative assembly known as the "General Syrian Conference", which adopted the "Fundamental Statute" that provided for a civil constitutional monarchy, decentralized administration, guaranteed political and economic freedoms, the rights of religious communities, equality between citizens and the holding of free elections to the Council of Representatives by secret ballot in two rounds (article 73). Elections were free and the government had no right to intervene or oppose them (article 77).

The French colonial power could not tolerate the idea of independence, and its forces entered Syria. Three days after the Battle of Maysaloun, the occupying forces occupied Damascus, exiled King Faisal and desolated the kingdom on July 28, 2020.

Emad Hajjaj

After the tragic and grotesque fall of the Ottoman caliphate, no one could speak of a caliphate or an Islamic state according to hereditary, medieval sultanic logic. In several Muslim countries, political and social organizations emerged, calling for the construction of an Islamic state. If Hassan al-Banna is the most famous in the Arabic-speaking world, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi occupied center stage in the Islamic world. Abu al-Alaa was a keen observer and connoisseur of the characteristics of the times in which Muslims lived in the Indian peninsula, but also of the rise of totalitarian ideological currents on a global scale - Stalinism in the East, Nazism and Fascism in the West. The imprint of these currents can be clearly seen in al-Mawdudi's definition of the Islamic State:

- "The Islamic state is a state run by a particular party that believes in a particular doctrine. Anyone who accepts Islam can become a member of the party that has been founded to run this state, and those who do not accept it are not allowed to intervene in state affairs and can live within the state's borders as dhimmis."

- "The Islamic State is a totalitarian state that governs all aspects of life." (Al-Mawdudi writes this in English, in addition to Urdu and Arabic).

- God has endowed man with these limits, an independent system and a universal constitution that admits of no change or modification.... If you wish, you can evade it and declare war, as Turkey and Iran have done, but you cannot make the slightest alteration to it, for it is an eternal divine constitution that cannot be changed or modified."[3]

We see in these three points the common family tree of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Khomeinists, the jihadi Salafists, the Srourists (followers of Sheikh Srour from the Daraa region) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), for the principles set out by Mawdudi are all to be found there, with a few differences in literary expression or a few uncontested phrases. If the first version of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Syrian model of Dr. Mustafa al-Sibai did not adhere to the logic of the "sacred party", or what Khomeini calls in his book "Islamic Government": "the sacred band", we had to wait for Sayyid Qutb to see a clearer identification between these components.

The rise of "public religion" and the fall of contemporary ideologies have had a considerable impact on the rise, extremism and radicalization of Islamic political movements. The fabrication of the enemy has played a key role in the introduction of takfir (defining the boundaries between believer and disbeliever, between pagan and Islamic society), prohibition (lumping together everything that is forbidden, prohibited and reprehensible) and destruction (considering jihad or sacred violence as the only way to establish God's reign on earth). As Yassin al-Haj Saleh puts it: "In Afghanistan, the enemy was the Soviet Union, then the USA; in Iraq, it was the Americans and their allies in the Shiite organizations; in Syria, the enemy was essentially the revolution"[4].

At Cairo Stadium on June 15, 2013, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was present in person to announce the results of the first enlarged meeting between Salafist "scholars", Muslim Brotherhood "scholars" and leaders of the World Union of Muslim Ulemas, at which it was unanimously decided to declare jihad in Syria. To announce the results of this meeting and proclaim its decision, the participants appointed the Egyptian Sheikh Mohamed Hassan:

"The pure land of Egypt hosted a conference attended by nearly 500 scholars, belonging to more than 70 bodies, organizations and associations. These scholars issued a fatwa and agreed that jihad is a duty of life, wealth and arms, each according to his means. The jihad to defend blood and honor is now an individual duty for the Syrian people and a collective duty for Muslims the world over. This is what we owe to the Lord of heaven and earth" [5].

Since then, the differences between so-called moderate or political Islam and Salafist jihadist theses have disappeared, and "legitimizing" the presence of foreign fighters in Syria was processed through the greatest collective fatwa in contemporary Islamic history. Syrian Muslims, whatever their factions and orientations, are no longer masters of their present and future in the conflict between a corrupt dictatorship and the largest popular movement facing it. The massive arrival of over 120,000 non-Syrian fighters from some sixty countries, with financial, material and logistical facilities that have surpassed anything we have seen in the Afghan experience, has constituted a complete change in the nature, geography and objectives of armed conflict and infighting, as well as in the nature of the state desired for change.

Al-Baghdadi proclaimed the caliphate, seen as the longed-for righteous Islamic State, and conflict within jihadist formations intensified, leading to bloody clashes that are rarely echoed by supporters of the "Islamic Liberation Commission in Syria" (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). If the great split between the Islamic State in Iraq and the al-Nosra Front has had its share of attention and study, the "Sahwa" has been one of the boldest and most cultured movements among Syrian jihadists, when Hassan Abboud, leader of the Ahrar al-Sham movement, aided by the young Mohammed al-Shami, drafted "The Revolutionary Charter of Honor", one of the most important revisions in the history of "Salafist jihadism" in Syria. This charter clarified the boundaries between the general theses of the Salafist jihadist movement and the Syrian jihadist project for change on essential points, which go beyond the struggle for power and authority to touch on the very conception of the desired state:

"- The political aim of the armed Syrian revolution is to overthrow the regime with all its symbols and pillars and bring it to justice, far from any revenge or settling of scores.

- The revolution militarily targets the Syrian regime, which has exercised terrorism against our people with its regular and irregular military forces and those who support them, such as Iranian mercenaries, Hezbollah and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, as well as all those who aggress and apostatize our people, such as Daesh. Military action is limited to Syrian territory.

- The overthrow of the regime is a joint undertaking of the various revolutionary forces. Aware of the regional and international dimension of the Syrian crisis, we are open to meeting and cooperating with regional and international actors in solidarity with the Syrian people, in the interests of the revolution.

- Preserving the unity of Syrian territory and preventing any plans for partition by all available means is a non-negotiable revolutionary principle.

- Our revolutionary force relies in its military action on the Syrian element and is convinced of the need for a purely Syrian political and military decision, rejecting any dependence on foreigners.

- The Syrian people aspire to the establishment of a state of justice, law and freedoms, free from pressure and diktats.

- The Syrian revolution is a moral and ethical revolution that aims to establish freedom, justice and security for Syrian society in all its ethnic and religious diversity.

- The Syrian revolution is committed to respecting the human rights preached by our religion."[6]

Clearly, the Syrian "Islamic Front" decided that day to break with what it called the "global jihad" or what the al-Nosra Front called the "Sunni jihad". [7] in Syria. Not surprisingly, forty-five members of its leadership were mass-murdered in the largest attack in fourteen years of revolution and war on Syrian territory, and evidence revealed years later the involvement of the "al-Nosra Front" in collaboration with the Turkish secret service (MIT) in the massacre.

I always dwell on this important document, because it shows and explains the difference between the al-Nosra Front and its offshoots, from the Levant Conquest Front to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the jihadist factions that have adopted the state of justice, law and freedoms in this pact.

Another major bone of contention between the al-Nosra Front and other Syrian organizations was the adoption by the al-Nosra Front and Daesh of an approach aimed at integrating foreign fighters into organizational structures and positions of responsibility. As the al-Nosra Front was made up of Syrians and foreigners, then joined by some inmates of Sednaya prison, its command and religious leaders remained in the hands of non-Syrians, with a few Syrians. In the early years of its existence, Syrians accounted for over 70% of its membership and held most of the decision-making positions. This became clear when Hassan Abboud declared on Al-Jazeera that he feared the harmful role of foreign jihadists: "We don't need non-Syrian elements, we have enough Syrian fighters, especially as many immigrants have fallen victim to misinformation and their initial support has turned into a curse". He made it a condition of any dialogue with al-Nosra that it disassociate itself from al-Qaeda, stressing that "the decision must be purely Syrian".

The al-Nosra Front responded: "We at the al-Nosra Front categorically and unambiguously reject any minimization or concealment of the role of the immigrant brothers in this blessed jihad. They have played an immense and important role in supporting the people of Syria, in accordance with God's word: {And if they ask you for help in religion, you must help them} We will respond to them only with benevolence and gratitude, for our Lord, the Merciful, has said: {Is good repaid with anything other than good?} We are united with Muslims by religious brotherhood that transcends any territorial or national ties, and our support for Muslims is based on religion and loyalty to it, not on homeland, land and loyalty to it, for Allah, the Almighty, has said: {And why should you not fight in the way of Allah, while men, women, children and infants are oppressed?} And the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim, he neither deceives nor betrays him". Let everyone know that the Islamic state we want is a state founded above all on religion, faith and Sharia law, and it is to this that we owe our loyalty and allegiance. For us, a Muslim is not the equal of a disbeliever, as Allah has said: {Will we treat Muslims like criminals?} And the Prophet (pbuh) said: "The strongest bond of faith is to love for Allah and hate for Allah." What harms our migrant brothers harms us, what affects them affects us, and whoever criticizes them criticizes us. O migrants, this land of Syria is vast, settle in it, and Syria's doors will remain wide open to all those who want to support her and do good for her and her people".

The al-Nosra Front has gone from strength to strength, constantly relying on a high percentage of foreign fighters. The words "Syrian" and "Syria" are absent from its publications and leaflets. In its textbooks, schools and the positions of its religious leaders, it has drawn on the most extreme and radical jihadist writings and positions on the Syrian national question. Even in his experience in power in Idlib, clerics and security officials were the real decision-makers in the government, army, security services, religious police and intervention in people's daily lives. When we look at the speeches and writings of the Syrian figures of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, we see that they only repeat and reiterate what was said in Abu Musab al-Suri's (Mustafa Set Mariam Nassar) "Call to Global Islamic Resistance", "Issues of jurisprudence relating to jihad " by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (Abu Rahman al-Ali), " Managing barbarism" by Abu Bakr Naji (Mohammed Khalil al-Hakim) and " Jihad and ijtihad " by Abu Qatada al-Filistini. We understand why Hassan Abboud describes them as follows: "Young people with futile dreams, with no knowledge of religion or the Sharia".